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ABSTRACT 
High-risk outdoor recreation allows its enthusiasts to reach 
unprecedented levels of adrenaline; it also contains risks 
and requires specific training (in part technological). In 
particular, its participants must be ready to react efficiently 
during an emergency or in response to an accident. 
Technological training grounds can simulate particular 
contexts and emergency situations as a place for 
recreationists to train and practice. In this paper, we use the 
practice of avalanche companion rescue as a case study to 
explore how technological training grounds support 
recreationist training. Our results offer insights into how 
avalanche beacon training parks support skill development 
and team coordination training. We also present strategies 
to orient the design of technological training grounds 
beyond avalanche companion rescue.  
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ACM Classification Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past years, there has been an increase in high-risk 
outdoor recreation activities, sometimes labeled as extreme 
sports, ‘modern outdoor activities’ [37], ‘skilled 
adventures’ [6] or risky forms of recreation [4]. Those 
sports have been characterized as “specialised, highly 
technological and demanding a high degree of preparation, 
and are associated with individual endeavour, risk, speed, 
and excitement” [37:36]. Examples include climbing, 
skydiving, mountain biking, big wave surfing, BASE 
jumping, white water kayaking, kite boarding, heli-skiing, 
and backcountry skiing. Such sports are also characterized 
by ‘communities of interest’ [4:12], comprising people who 
participate in those activities, use specific areas in the 
outdoors, and use particular equipment. Members of these 
communities demonstrate a desire for risk-taking, while at 
the same time cultivating a high knowledge for the sport 
they practice, including its risks and dangers [6].  
As sports and recreation continue to develop into the more 
extreme and risky spheres, there is also a growing need for 
ongoing simulated practice and training for recreationists 
and outdoor enthusiasts. That need is even more important 
for situations within the practice that happen rarely but that 
can be life threatening. Examples include rappel rescue 
techniques for rock-climbing accidents, canyon extraction 
for canyoneers, swiftwater rescue for paddlers in danger, 
and avalanche rescue for backcountry skiers. Yet unlike 
professional guides, the typical recreationist training relies 
on a few short (and possibly superficial) courses. 
Furthermore, they are rarely exposed to real situations 
requiring that training. Thus even ‘trained’ enthusiasts can 
become quite rusty over time. At the same time, digital 
technology is becoming increasingly incorporated into 
many of these activities, particularly through the use of 
portable devices running specialized apps. As these devices 
are integrated into those activities, they need to be included 
as part of the training program. For example, GPS devices 
are critical both for routine route finding in the 
backcountry, and for deciding on alternative routes when 
problems occur (e.g. [14]). Personal satellite trackers (e.g., 
the SPOT GPS Messenger, www.findmespot.ca) allow 
people to check in periodically to inform others not only 
about their location and well-being, but to send out a 
distress and location signal when they require rescue. 
Various apps and devices let people monitor specialized 
environmental forecasts and bulletins in order to help their 
decision making, such as extreme changes in weather 
during backcountry travel, winds when skydiving, potential 
for flash floods when canyoneering, and local avalanche 
conditions when backcountry skiing (e.g., 
www.avalanche.ca). Some devices are solely dedicated to 
handling particular emergency situation, such as avalanche 
transceivers (beacons) that help people locate victims 
buried in an avalanche [13]. 
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For these devices to be used effectively, recreationists need 
to understand how to use them within the context of their 
real-world activity. This goes beyond reading the user 
manual. While one can read about the functions of (say) a 
GPS unit or an avalanche transceiver, their actual use 
during the high-risk activity demands far more knowledge 
and expertise. The consequences of misuse or inefficient 
use can be extremely serious. Misreading a GPS while 
skiing on a glacier during a whiteout can lead the group to 
extremely hazardous terrain. Inefficient use of an avalanche 
transceiver can lead to delays during rescue, resulting in 
suffocation of the buried victims before they are found [12]. 
The challenge is that people need to learn how to use these 
devices and the best practices around them within their 
recreational context. Yet learning while actually doing the 
activity is often impractical due to the inherent danger and 
time constraints of the activity, and the relative rarity of 
critical events. Hence, training often occurs in specially 
crafted physical settings - technological training grounds - 
that simulate particular contexts and emergency situations.  
Our goal in this paper is to understand the use of these 
technological training grounds and how to better design 
them. We chose to study the case of backcountry skiing and 
the specific practice of the avalanche companion rescue 
protocol within avalanche training beacon parks (both will 
be described shortly). Avalanche companion rescue training 
is particularly interesting to both HCI and CSCW because 
its success relies on several aspects: how each rescuer 
masters the skills of using his or her tools during particular 
emergency scenarios (including technology such as an 
avalanche transceiver), how the rescuers as a team are able 
to collaborate and coordinate on scene while using that 
technology, and how people support the training of others 
through facilitation and mentorship.  
In this paper, we take on the dual roles of being CSCW 
researchers as well as backcountry skiing recreationists. 
One of the authors and observers is a professional 
avalanche education specialist. Another author is a 
recreationist with considerable experience running 
avalanche simulations: he was once completely buried in an 
avalanche, and had to be found and rescued by his team 
(see account in Part I, [7]). The third is a recent convert to 
the activity and who has run through training sessions 
herself. While we use the observations we made of our 
participants to ground our analysis, we also interpret and 
extend what we saw to our own in-depth experiences of 
similar situations done 'in the wild'.  
After describing related work, we present the two parts of 
our research: 1) an observational study of recreationists 
training in the avalanche beacon training park with 
subsequent semi-structured interviews, and 2) our 
reflections on maintaining a beacon park. We report our 
results under the themes of skill development, team 
coordination training, and designing beacon parks as a 
technological training ground. To foreshadow, our main 
findings articulate the value of a progressive difficulty scale 
of scenarios, the importance of levels of fidelity, finding a 
balance between skill development vs. team coordination 
training, and the challenges in supporting communities of 
practice in simulations for recreationists. 
RELATED WORK 
Team cognition and team training 
Training, and specifically training of non-professionals to 
work as an ad-hoc team in critical situations, is central to 
our work. Previous research has articulated in great details 
team cognition, cross training, and the importance of shared 
mental models. We present a very brief summary of this 
more general work and will come back to concepts 
mentioned here in the presentation of our results.  
Team training 
Teams are understood to be “social entities composed of 
members with high task interdependency and shared and 
valued common goals” [36:541]. Moreover, teamwork 
requires the ability to adapt coordination strategies by 
communicating and orienting the team towards reaching 
their goal [38]. Achieving successful and efficient 
teamwork is not easy and requires team training. In addition 
to mastering one’s role and tasks, it has been argued that 
each team member should also gain a shared mental model 
of the team goals, tasks, and needs. Shared mental models 
are particularly useful for people working in teams because 
it allows individuals to predict and explain what is 
happening around them and further allows them to make 
decisions about what to do [32].  
In avalanche companion rescue, a group of recreationists 
must quickly become a team when they have the shared and 
valued goal of rescuing one of their companions. However, 
unlike most teams discussed in the literature, the group is 
ad hoc. Some may not have met before, they may not have 
trained together, and the level of training and practice 
between team members can vary considerably. As well, 
individuals may not be familiar with each other’s skill level, 
which can affect how roles within the team are assigned and 
how well they are carried out.  
Thus we find particular value in the concept of cross 
training (specifically, positional rotation [8]): a strategy in 
which each team member learns about and is trained on the 
other roles and tasks within the team [30,42]. This allows 
each team member to gain a better mental model of the 
team’s work and can lead to enhanced implicit coordination 
in the team (by reducing the need for overt communication 
and explanations) [29] and to more seamlessly exchanging 
roles ad hoc within the team.  
Team training through simulations  
CSCW has focused on the collaborative aspect of training 
in emergency situations. Examples include observational 
studies of air traffic control [11], health care [3], 
firefighting [21,39,40], avalanche rescue [13] and real-
world emergencies [27]. Researchers have also created new 
systems to better support training, often focusing on 
collaborative practices. Proposed solutions include tabletop 
systems [11], wearables [9,22], games [27,40], and virtual 
environments [28].  
The literature on simulations and training discusses the 
different dimensions and types of simulation. For example, 
Beaubien and Baker [3] offer three types of simulation 
(case studies/role plays, part task trainers, and full mission) 
and three dimensions of fidelity in simulations 
(environment, equipment, and psychological). The authors 
articulate how each training exercise or facility can offer 
more or less fidelity on each dimension, which can reflect 
particular sub-areas of a more complex practice. However, 
they also state: “although the three fidelity components are 
inter-related, psychological fidelity [the degree to which the 
trainee perceives the simulation to be a believable surrogate 
for the trained task] is generally considered to be the most 
essential requirement for team training” [3:i52]. Literature 
on simulations also proposes that some aspects of practices 
can be learned without a complete simulation [40] and that 
in fact a full simulation can be unnecessary [35].  
However, it is important to note here how our work differs 
from the above. As mentioned, the training and simulations 
typically studied in CSCW are oriented towards 
professionals and experts in emergency management and 
rescue. That audience is distinctly different from high-risk 
recreationists (such as the companion rescuers in the case of 
an avalanche [13]). Unlike professionals, they do not 
necessarily commit or have the time to commit to extensive 
formal training. Unlike professionals, recreationists often 
form ad hoc groups for each outing vs. stable teams that 
work together over time. Thus no single group learns how 
to work together as a team during emergencies. As well, a 
particular group may include strangers and/or people of 
quite different (and perhaps unknown) levels of expertise. 
These distinctions are at the center of the motivation for this 
paper: how are technological training grounds used by these 
recreational groups, and how can they be designed to best 
train people to respond to the life or death situations 
inherent in their practices? 
Ad hoc and volunteer teams 
CSCW has an established tradition in studying and 
designing for disaster communities and emergency response 
groups, with a particular focus on ad hoc and improvised 
collaborative volunteer work. Past research has addressed 
the important role of social media (e.g. [19,20,33]) and 
virtual communities (e.g. [31,38]) in disasters and mass 
emergency events. Improvisation and ad hoc teaming 
resonate very strongly with the practice of avalanche 
companion rescue since it is impossible to know who will 
be part of the rescue team and what role everyone will need 
to play (as we will describe in the Our Study section). 
However, avalanche companion rescue has its own unique 
characteristics that differ from this past work, mostly 
because of the immediacy of the event. Expertise cannot be 
called in, as the remote areas involving backcountry skiing 
means there is often no wireless or cellular network access, 
and thus no access to social media or virtual communities. 
All the teamwork has to be performed on site, with only the 
people who are present as rescuers, with only the equipment 
immediately available, and within a short period of time. 
Even if people can communicate to the outside world, the 
arrival of additional parties is often far later than the critical 
time required for finding and unburying the victim alive. 
Communities of practice and situated learning 
Most high-risk recreational activities occur in a social 
context, where its players strongly identify with a 
community of like-minded people. Formal and informal 
clubs are common, specialized social media sites develop, 
open invitation social gatherings abound, and courses are 
offered by both professional and lay people [4]. Similarly, 
training is often part of a social event. 
This social structure is captured by the concept of 
communities of practice as developed by anthropologists 
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger [24,43]. These communities 
refer to groups of people who share a passion, a craft, or a 
profession. Central to these communities is how learning is 
situated in the social, where practitioners share knowledge 
and experience of their field of the practice, and thus learn 
from each other [23]. Communities of practice display a 
shared repertoire of experience, stories, best practices, and 
equipment and tools, all which help inform its members. 
The act of learning is further situated in the real world [24], 
as it often occurs as they perform their shared practice. 
Wenger [43] argues that it is by being part of a community 
of practice and by practicing alongside ‘old timers’ (people 
with considerable experience) that newcomers can learn the 
skills, techniques, values and norms of a community of 
experts. This process takes time and ‘repeated and enduring 
exposure’ is necessary for learning to happen [25]. 
In the case of backcountry skiing recreationists, some 
aspects of the practice are passed on via this situated 
learning as they are performing the activity. Examples 
include the selection and review of appropriate equipment 
by members at the start of the activity, route finding and 
terrain choice discussion while travelling, and even critique 
and fine-tuning of skiing techniques. The practice of 
avalanche companion rescue does not benefit as much in 
situated learning. Since avalanches are rare but serious 
occurrences, learning must happen in different ways, such 
as through reading and instructional videos, and by taking 
formal courses. While simulations can occur in the field 
(e.g., by one member of a group burying a transceiver while 
others try to find it), they are rarely and often hastily done: 
people would rather ski.  
We are thus particularly sensitive to the notion of 
communities of practice, where we see it as one way to 
better understand the use of technological training grounds 
by outdoor recreationists, both in terms of skill 
development and team coordination. 
OUR STUDY 
Our study took place in a dedicated area at Mount Baker 
Ski Area in Washington, U.S.A. Our study comprised 2 
parts: an observational study with interviews of participants 
using the beacon park, and a reflection on our own practice 
of installing and modifying the beacon park in response to 
what we observed. As the two parts of the study happened 
simultaneously and influenced each other, we continuously 
evolved and refined our research questions. Two of the 
authors, a CSCW researcher (also newly a backcountry 
skier) and a professional avalanche education specialist 
were on site to install, maintain a wireless beacon park, and 
conduct the study for 4 weekends, one day per weekend. 
The education specialist served a dual role, where he acted 
as both as an observer and as a facilitator for those 
requiring or asking for help.  
Before we go further, we provide necessary background 
information on backcountry skiing, companion rescue and 
the functioning of avalanche beacon training parks. A 
detailed description of the avalanche rescue protocol 
written for a CSCW audience can be found in [13].  
Backcountry Skiing, Avalanches & Companion Rescue 
Backcountry skiing (and snowboarding) is a popular 
activity. Skiers travel under their own power (both uphill 
and down) outside of ski resorts in mountains. Rewards 
include breath-taking views, vigorous exercise, challenging 
and rewarding ski lines, and pristine untouched snow. The 
risk is an avalanche, a large volume of loose snow that 
rapidly slides down a slope [12], which can bury and injure 
skiers, and that can have fatal consequences. When caught 
and buried in an avalanche, victims rely on teams of 
rescuers, often their traveling companions, to save them 
through a process called avalanche companion rescue. 
Companion rescue is challenging, stressful, complex, and 
time sensitive as the chance of survival decreases 
significantly after 15 minutes in a complete burial [16].  
Most backcountry skiers carry tools to perform companion 
avalanche rescue. Avalanche transceivers (also called 
beacons) are portable electronic devices that transmit a 
locatable signal. Each skier wears one turned on as a matter 
of routine. Rescuers can use the same beacon on receive 
mode to search for the victim, where rescuers try to locate 
the snowpack surface directly above or nearby the victim. 
In addition, collapsible probes (long poles several meters in 
length) are used to physically probe the snowpack area to 
locate a victim. Avalanche shovels – collapsible for 
transport – are used to dig out the victim. While other safety 
tools are available on the market, the trio of transceiver-
probe-shovel is the most commonly used amongst 
recreationists. Transceivers are the technological tools used 
to find the most buried victims (as per the last two decades 
statistics in the U.S.A. [2]). 
Companion rescue with an avalanche transceiver follows a 
well-defined protocol. Avalanche rescue educators and 
researchers have developed and improved this protocol 
since the 1970s. It is taught in rescue literature, avalanche 
rescue classes, and workshops (e.g. [12,41]). While slight 
variations in advance techniques exist, the main steps 
remain the same [18]. It begins with initial coordination. 
Rescuers (the victim’s or victims’ companions who have 
witnessed the avalanche) quickly coordinate themselves. 
They discuss further risks for themselves as rescuers (e.g. 
potential future avalanches, or dangerous terrain like cliffs), 
and gather information concerning who saw what. They 
rapidly discuss what needs to be done, where each assumes 
an initial role with particular duties (e.g., leader, searcher, 
prober). While taking a minute or two, initial coordination 
leads to better overall efficiency, better safety management, 
and makes sure that no time is wasted [13].  
The next step is the signal search. Here, searchers travel on 
skis on the avalanche path and the avalanche debris 
(generally settled hard chunks of snow and ice) in a pattern 
that covers the whole area that could contain the buried 
victim. They use their beacons on search mode to find the 
signal emitted by the victim’s beacon under the snow. Once 
a signal is found, usually at a range of less than 60 meters, 
the rescuer starts the coarse search and follows the 
indications on the beacon (a visual distance and direction 
cue, and an audible cue) to get closer to the victim. When 
close to the victim, the rescuer removes his skis, kneels and 
starts the fine search of the strongest signal (called 
bracketing) to further narrow down the victim’s location. 
Depending on the depth of the burial and other factors, this 
location may still not be exactly over the victim. To 
pinpoint the location of the victim, the searcher calls in the 
probers who start probing – repeatedly pushing the probes 
through the snow in a regular pattern around that region – 
where they try to strike (and thus locate) the victim. Next is 
shoveling the snow out of the way, first to bring an airway 
to the victim, and then to extract the victim from the snow. 
As shoveling through a settled snow pack is non-trivial and 
exhausting work, there is even a protocol that dictates 
efficient methods for team shoveling. When the victim is 
uncovered, first aid begins. The last step is to transport the 
victim out of the backcountry as needed.   
While this protocol sounds straightforward, much can go 
wrong. For the search portion, beacon signals can be lost or 
confused, with searchers backtracking or even going around 
in circles. Rescuers may fixate on one victim’s signal, at the 
cost of another victim. If a party member had accidentally 
left their transceiver on ‘transmit’ mode, that signal could 
mislead other searchers. Probers and searchers doing the 
fine search work atop the same small area: probers may 
miss areas that should be covered, or think they have a 
‘strike’ when they do not, and searchers may miss the 
strongest signal. All leads to confusion. Shoveling through 
avalanche debris must be done efficiently (via a well-
defined method) as it is otherwise extremely difficult, tiring 
and time-consuming. These all matter greatly, as even the 
loss of a few minutes in the process may mean the 
difference between life and death.  
Because of the above, best practices demand that 
recreationists learn and regularly practice with their 
equipment, understand the protocol for finding a victim, 
and know the procedures for working as a companion 
rescue team [1]. They must also be ready to work with 
strangers. They must be ready to improvise and readjust the 
protocol depending on who is doing the rescue, how many 
people are available, and to accommodate everyone’s skill 
levels. Recreationists are highly encouraged to take 
professional avalanche courses, where an instructor offers 
the basics of avalanche safety, and additionally encouraged 
to practice their skills on their own (individually or as a 
team), at least once every ski season [13]. Another option is 
to train in an avalanche beacon training park (or beacon 
park for short). Unfortunately, there are no data available 
that can inform us on the number of recreationists that take 
classes, how they practice, how many use beacon parks, etc. 
What is known is that there is a huge diversity of training. 
While many recreationists take training very seriously, 
there are many backcountry users with little training.  
Concerted efforts have been made to improve this situation 
by providing more avalanche training such as avalanche 
awareness courses to high-risk groups (e.g. high school and 
university students who have recently taken up backcountry 
boarding or skiing, and snow-mobilers who have 
traditionally eschewed avalanche courses). However, 
avalanche awareness courses are insufficient by themselves: 
their goal is to have its attendees recognize the risk of 
avalanches, and to persuade them to take proper avalanche 
courses (e.g. see www.avalanche.ca/training#overview). 
The second effort to increase avalanche training is through 
the provision of avalanche beacon training parks 
Avalanche Beacon Training Parks 
An avalanche beacon training park is a practice field 
containing pre-installed avalanche beacons [10]. They are 
usually located at ski hills or at road heads in backcountry 
areas, and their locations are advertised and signed (Fig 1c). 
A beacon park typically comprises 8 to 16 practice beacons 
that emit the same radio signal (457 Hz) as normal 
avalanche beacons. Beacons are protected in a waterproof 
case, and screwed to a 50 cm2 plywood sheet (Fig 1a) that 
simulates the victim’s surface area when probing. Beacons 
are buried under the snow at the beginning of the season, 
with their depth varying over time with the snowpack. A 
beacon park can also be installed temporarily, such as for 
an event. Beacon parks include a control box (Fig 1b) 
controlling the operation of the practice beacons.  
To use the beacon park, recreationists arrive on site with 
their own beacons. They turn on one or more practice 
beacons through the control box. They use their personal 
beacons to do the coarse and fine search towards one signal 
at a time and then use their probes to detect the plywood 
holding the practice beacon through the snow. The practice 
stops there. Unfortunately, while an important skill to 
practice, digging is generally not done within the beacon 
park for different reasons: the heavily-trodden snow is often 
frozen into place and makes digging unrealistic; it keeps the 
terrain as smooth as possible to eliminate hints for others; it 
keeps the snow depth deep which simulates deep burials.  
Research Questions  
We focus specifically on avalanche beacon training parks as 
an illustrative case study of a technological training ground. 
We ask: 
• How do recreationists use beacon parks for both skill 
development and team coordination? 
• How can we design beacon parks to better fit the needs 
of the recreational community of backcountry skiers? 
The domain of avalanche rescue is largely one of 
practitioners and practitioner expertise. While there are 
conferences on all aspects of avalanche  (e.g. International 
Snow Science Workshop), the topic of companion rescue 
and its associated risks does not lend itself to the kinds of 
academic treatment that we could expect in typical 
academic CSCW research. Thus our methodology is not 
purely objective. We add a subjective component, where we 
provide our own insights into issues of transceiver use and 
avalanche risks, and in interpreting what participants do in 
beacon parks. We stress that our views are not unusual, but 
they echo views commonly held by avalanche professionals 
and recreationists. Finally, as we will describe shortly, our 
methodology is observational by default, but moves to 
interventionist both to be helpful to the participants (who 
are using the beacon park for a real purpose) and to see how 
that intervention helps.  
Part I: Observational study and interviews  
Part I of the study focused on our first research question. 
Observational data was gathered with the goal of 
constructing a detailed portrait of how recreationists used 
 
    Figure 1. a) Practice beacon in waterproof case on plywood. b) Beacon park control box. c) Beacon park area. 
the Mount Baker beacon park somewhat ‘in the wild’: they 
were allowed to pursue their own activities, but had the 
option of using an on-site expert as a resource. 
Participants. We recruited participants by advertising the 
opportunity to practice avalanche companion rescue in a 
beacon park, with the option of participating in a study. We 
advertised on online sports-related forums, through sports 
equipment shops’ social media, with print ads in the local 
community, and on the Mount Baker ski area’s website. We 
had 22 participants (5 female, 17 male). 12 were related to 
the Mount Baker ski area and 10 from the general public. 
We had 10 participants that came individually, 3 teams of 2, 
and 2 teams of 3. 10 had never used a beacon park, while 
the rest had used them at other ski resorts. There was a 
broad range of backcountry ski experience, from no 
experience to 16 years of experience. All had at least 
several years of resort skiing experience. We note that 
downhill skiing expertise did not necessarily correlate with 
backcountry experience or companion rescue expertise. For 
example, several volunteer ski patrollers participating in the 
study did not routinely go backcountry skiing, and had 
limited companion rescue training (if at all).  
We recognize that our participant sample is broad and 
varied, and may seem ‘at odds’ with a formal study. The 
benefit is that this variety is representative of people who 
actually use beacon parks ‘in the wild’. This was 
intentional. Rather than select a narrow slice of potential 
beacon park users, we wanted to have enough diversity to 
observe a range of the ways people went through scenarios. 
This in turn provides rich and detailed qualitative data. We 
should also add that this participant diversity matches our 
own personal experiences in seeing who uses beacon parks.  
Tasks. Participants came to the tent (Fig 1c), where we 
introduced a particular avalanche rescue scenario. They 
would then do a scenario, usually returning to the tent 
afterwards for the next scenario. The facilitator would offer 
his expertise to participants (perhaps after observing 
participants or on participants’ request), where he would 
offer tips, comments and even help them through particular 
scenarios. Otherwise, we let the participants use the beacon 
park in the way they wanted to keep the ecological validity 
of the study. We invited participants to perform as many 
rescues as they wanted. If participants had come alone, we 
let them use it by themselves. If they had come as a group, 
we suggested that they perform practices as a team.  
Data Collection. We conducted a pre-activity questionnaire 
to gather information about each participant’s motivation 
for using the beacon park, and their level of expertise in 
skiing, companion rescue, and beacon parks.  
As the participants used the beacon park, we observed them 
with the shadowing technique. We asked them to describe 
what they were thinking as they were doing their practice 
rescues. One researcher followed them and took hand 
written notes. We also filmed the participants for the length 
of the search with a GoPro camera. We wrote a report for 
each participant summarizing our observations on how they 
performed the rescues, how they used the beacon, how they 
collaborated with others, and how they modified their 
strategies of search from one scenario to another. 
Finally, we conducted post-activity semi-structured 
interviews with those participants who were willing (9 in 
total). The interview questions focused on participants’ 
experience of the beacon park (including positive and 
challenging aspects of practice, the development of skills, 
and the practice of coordination) and on beacons and 
beacon parks could be designed in the future. 
Part II: Reflections on maintaining a beacon park 
Part II of the study focused on our second research question 
where we reflected on the design strategies we used to 
install and maintain the beacon park, and the changes we 
made to our installation over the course of the study based 
on our observations in Part I. 
Installing and Maintaining the Beacon Park. For each day 
that we were on site, we created a series of scenarios. For 
each, we positioned and buried each practice beacon to 
create a variety of scenarios for participants. Each scenario 
used bamboo poles to indicate the start and end of the 
simulated avalanche path. Scenarios ranged in expected 
difficulty. The simplest were those simulating a single 
burial. More difficult scenarios simulated two victims 
located at various distances from one another. Multiple 
burials make it more difficult to locate a signal (due to 
multiple beacon signals), coordination complexity, and 
added stress due to the greater number of victims for the 
same survivable amount of time. For each day, we used 
insights gathered from the previous study day to modify the 
beacon park setup.  
Data Collection. The two on-site authors debriefed each 
other at the end of each study day. Through a written report, 
they recorded what they had observed in relation to the 
organization of the beacon park, the way the scenes were 
installed, the way information was communicated to 
 
Figure 2. Aerial view of day 3’s beacon park. Red circles show 
the simulated avalanche debris zones; numbers indicate the 
buried beacons. Yellow dotted lines and arrows indicate each 
scenario’s starting gate and direction of the simulated 
avalanche. (From Google Maps: during the study, snow 
covered the whole area) 
participants, and impressions for what worked well and 
what needed adjustment. We took photos of the training 
scenes and our installation. We also produced an aerial map 
of the beacon park locating each scenario (as in Fig. 2). 
Data analysis 
We conducted a thematic analysis [5] with all the data 
collected from both parts I and II, i.e., we identified and 
recorded patterns of phenomenon that emerged across the 
observations, interviews, and reports that comprise our 
primary data. We identified various themes, discussed next.  
RESULTS 
Our results are presented in five themes as reflected in our 
data analysis, each with a variety of sub-themes.  Dominant 
themes include: 1) individual skill development with the 
technology in context; 2) team coordination training 
including communication, role distribution, and team rescue 
strategies; 3) the false sense of confidence; 4) the beacon 
park as technological training ground, and 5) the role of the 
facilitator.  
Individual skill development in context 
The beacon park allowed for participants to practice 
individual skills with their beacons and advance team 
strategies for more efficient rescues. We observed a 
necessary progression starting with an individual’s 
familiarization with the technological tool and its functions, 
learning how to use that tool in the context of the simulated 
search, and then to a mastery of particular rescue skills.   
From familiarization to a mastery of skills in context  
All participants used the beacon park to develop and master 
particular skills, from beginners learning how to use a 
beacon to advanced practitioners focusing on sharpening 
their skills in complex multiple burial scenarios.  
For some participants (e.g. P1, P13, P15b)1, the beacon park 
was their first experience with a beacon and with the 
avalanche companion rescue protocol. Their learning 
largely revolved around the basics of the avalanche 
transceiver technology: how to turn the beacon on, how to 
switch between transmit and receive modes, and how to 
read the signals as one moved over the terrain. Even 
experienced people practiced with their technology. For 
example, the beacon park was seen as a good place to get to 
know new equipment, as functions and modes often differ 
between beacons. As P10b said, her motivation for coming 
to the beacon park was to “get used to my new beacon and 
practice avalanche rescue”. The beacon park also served as 
a catalyst for participants to become aware of technical or 
logistical issues with their equipment such as the lack of 
recharged batteries for example (P4).  
                                                            
1 Participants who came to the beacon park by themselves are 
referred to as P#. Participants who came as a group are referred to 
as P#a, P#b and P#c, with same #. 
Beyond familiarization with the beacon, participants used 
the beacon park to master certain skills. For example, 
couple P11a and P11b pushed each other to get the fastest 
times on the single burial scenarios. While one was 
performing the rescue, the other timed the rescue. This 
additional stress augmented the level of psychological 
fidelity [3] as well as provided a baseline for comparing 
results and progress for those participants. 
In addition to focusing on the technology (at least initially), 
participants were also interested in acquiring skills about 
using that technology within the context of an actual search.  
As P3c said: “It’s not just about turning the beacon on, but 
about the way to do the rescue too”. For instance, 
participants P3b, P5 and P10c all mentioned that they 
wanted to use the beacon park specifically as a way to 
become more proficient in the context of multiple burial 
scenarios. In their case, they used the simpler scenarios 
(single burials) as a warm up exercise before engaging with 
the scenarios they wanted to gain more experience with.  
The beacon park – more than an individual training tool 
It was interesting to note that almost half of our participants 
came alone to the beacon park. Participants came on their 
own for a multitude of reasons: they are new to backcountry 
skiing and are looking for a group to go with (e.g. P1), they 
had some free time between ski runs by themselves (e.g. 
P8), or they wanted to focus practice on their device (e.g. 
P13). Some of them were aware of the potential to practice 
as a group while others were not. But in any case, all found 
great value in using the beacon park and in practicing 
individual skill development with the built in scenarios.  
Team coordination training 
Our second study theme was how the beacon park 
supported team coordination training. While we saw that 
the beacon park can provide a fruitful setting for individual 
skill development, we also see its immense potential for 
practicing team coordination. This is important, as 
coordination is a critical component of a successful 
companion rescue that also needs practice. In addition, 
when participants came alone to the beacon park, they 
missed opportunities to learn from each other and to further 
deepen their relationships with other members of their 
community of practice. Some of them also missed 
opportunities to learn from an expert (if available), such as 
our own on-site facilitator. 
As we described previously, coordination is one of the 
hardest aspects of avalanche companion rescue, and 
therefore one of the areas with the most opportunities for 
improvement. In our discussions with participants, they 
were enthusiastic at the idea of practicing as part of a team:  
“I think that a group setting is more effective, and more fun 
than training alone. It is rare, or at least unwise, to travel 
in the backcountry alone, so training with other people 
seems to make sense. Also, from personal experience, 
communication is absolutely crucial in emergency 
situations, and it’s something that is often overlooked, so 
working it with other forms of practice, or training is a 
good idea.” (P13) 
Although most participants agreed that coordination and 
communication were highly important for the success of 
companion rescue, only 6 out of 22 reported to have 
practiced team coordination in the last year. In addition, as 
we will show below, practicing coordination did not come 
intuitively to various participants. 
Coordination: beyond the beacon 
One of the main challenges we observed in the beacon park 
was to move beyond understanding the beacon technology, 
to gain a larger perspective of the situation. When teams 
arrived on scene, we seldom saw overt discussions about 
roles or strategies for the rescue they were about to 
perform. Instead, we saw teams going in a scenario and 
focusing each on their beacons to look for signals. That is, 
participants focused on the technology rather than team 
coordination, and on the details of their search rather than 
the big picture of what was going on. This lack of 
communication often continued the rest of the search.  
For example, the team of P3a, P3b and P3c began their 
search by finding the first signal and focusing on it. As the 
three participants started to do a fine search on the first 
signal, they were too close together. P3a and P3b were in 
the way of P3c who was trying to narrow the probing area. 
Not only was this sub-optimal, but it also meant that no one 
was searching for the second victim. This could have easily 
been prevented by simple and short communication 
between the participants, e.g. ‘I’ll finish this search, P3b get 
your probe out, and P3c start the coarse search for the 
second victim’. Similarly, had a leader been selected, their 
role would have included identifying and remedying issues 
such as these.  
After observing the above situation, the facilitator debriefed 
these points with the participants. The participants then 
moved to the second multiple burial scenario and were 
encouraged to work more closely as a team and specifically 
to communicate better. They agreed that communication 
was important and that they should plan differently for the 
next scenario. However, in practice, and even with the 
proper intentions of the participants, communication was 
lacking and participants still showed signs of working 
individually instead of as a team. In fact, it seemed that the 
participants were still very much focused on understanding 
their own beacons and that most of their attention remained 
on the technology rather than the teamwork. This finding 
reveals that coordination and communication may not come 
easily, and that considerable practice is required to achieve 
a level of team coordination proficiency. In summary, 
participants in teams that lacked communication unduly 
focused their attention on the beacon. They did not maintain 
a broader perspective of the situation, which resulted in a 
loss of situational awareness. This is similar to the finding 
described in [13] and critiqued as a flaw in beacon designs.  
As a contrasting example to the previous case, the team of 
P10a, P10b, and P10c (who had never performed a rescue 
together) had much better communication and were able to 
coordinate on the scene. At the entrance of the scenario, 
P10c proposed to his teammates to split the avalanche path 
into search paths for each of them. As they walked down 
the hill, P10c reached the first victim. P10a and P10b got 
closer to him as well, as their beacons also indicated that 
direction. While P10b got ready to help P10c by probing, 
P10a recognized that he was not needed there and walked 
past them to search and find the second victim. In this case, 
the team was able to monitor each other’s actions and 
fluidly take the roles that were the best for the team’s 
success (rapidly deciding to be a prober, or to leave the first 
victim and start the search of the second). This finding 
illustrates what Faraj and Xiao [17] describe as Plug-and-
Play teaming, where team members can take on different 
roles, as long as the requisite expertise is adequate and 
situation awareness is maintained. The teams that are 
flexible enough to subdivide and reconstitute themselves in 
an ad hoc manner are more successful in emergency 
situations [17]. 
Mastering specialized roles  
Our results also show another strategy for teams practicing 
together: mastering specialized roles as part of a team. In 
some cases, participants, often teams of 2, would each lean 
towards a role that they would keep from scenario to 
scenario. For example, P11a acted as the prober while P11b 
did the fine search and the bracketing: 
“The most challenging parts were probably working out 
how to best work efficiently as a team. After several tries, 
we realized that it was best if as soon as one of us got a 
signal, the other one immediately started getting out their 
probe. Since it is relatively quick to follow a signal and 
relatively time-consuming to get out a probe, it almost 
always still worked out that the person following the signal 
was bracketing the site by the time the person with the 
probe was ready to start trying to get strikes”. (P11a) 
Their strategy led to very efficient practice rescues. 
However, the challenge with this strategy is in the lack of 
flexibility between the roles. In a real accident, one never 
knows who might be a victim and thus not able to perform 
their role as rescuer. Similarly, the person with that 
expertise may be downslope, where it would take 
considerable time to return uphill to the avalanche site. 
Hence, it is as important to practice other roles to be more 
versatile. This strategy can be a stepping stone before 
practicing a more fluid exchange of roles in the practice. 
P11a and P11b eventually recognized this as a problem, 
where they exchanged roles during their last scenario in 
order to get a feel for each other’s role. This example 
exemplifies one of the types of cross training [42]: 
positional rotation, a strategy where each team member 
learns about each others’ tasks and roles by doing them first 
hand [8]. In addition, this strategy was reported to lead to 
inter-positional knowledge which is crucial to “team 
functioning because it allows team members to anticipate 
the task needs of fellow team members, thus allowing 
enhanced coordination with a minimal communication 
requirement” [42:88]. Moreover, it is central to avalanche 
companion rescue practice since it is impossible for 
rescuers to predict what role they will need to take 
depending on the situation. 
Breaking the false sense of confidence 
In previous research, it was pointed out that practice that is 
too simple or too easy can lead to a false sense of 
confidence for backcountry recreationists [13]. In this 
study, we found that the way the scenarios were organized 
in the beacon park and the variety of their expected 
difficulty could help break that false sense of confidence for 
participants. This allowed them to realize the complexity 
and challenges that are part of some avalanche accidents 
and served as a confirmation that practicing is important for 
avalanche preparedness.  
We often observed the following pattern. Participants who 
began with a sequence of single burial scenarios became 
faster and more efficient at finding the single victim. This 
boosted their sense of confidence about their ability to 
perform successful rescues. When participants moved to 
more challenging scenarios, such as a coarse search on a 
multiple burial scene, difficulty increased significantly, for 
example because they encountered confusing indications on 
beacon signals, and because more team coordination was 
required. In these cases, we saw some participants able to 
find a first victim but not the second one. In other cases, 
participants could find both victims but took a much longer 
time relative to the single burial scenarios. In most cases, 
the harder scenarios shook the participants’ confidence and 
trust in their beacon.  
One issue appears to be that participants – particularly those 
with less experience – had an incorrect view of the 
accuracy, precision and robustness of the technology they 
were using. Beacons have significant problems with the 
multiple signals received in a multiple burial scenario. They 
do not always display competing signals in an 
understandable manner. For example, some beacons 
alternate distance numbers between the two victims, which 
some found confusing (e.g. P1), while others fix onto one 
signal while hiding the other. Beacons sometimes lose the 
signal due to the rapid movements of a searcher. In other 
beacons, the screen can even go black. Some beacons try to 
simplify searching by allowing the search to hide a 
particular signal (called ‘marking’), yet this is considered 
an advanced feature and introduces further problems. A 
beacon may even have to be turned off and on again to 
reacquire a lost signal (e.g. P5). These events are, of course, 
stressful (as reported by various participants) as this is often 
the first time they have seen their beacon act like this. Their 
confidence is shaken, and their mental model of the 
technology is broken. It is only through practice, repetition 
and mentoring that participants were able to make sense of 
the nuances of their beacon and of those signals, where they 
could eventually perform rescues more successfully.  
A sequence of progressively more difficult scenarios helps 
mitigate this loss of confidence. Although harder scenarios 
were more challenging, participants appreciated the 
opportunity to sharpen their skills. For example, P15a 
suggested: “Keep the progression of difficulty going. Maybe 
also add a 3 person burial scenario, something even more 
complex”. Our decision to seed the beacon park with 
multiple scenarios representing different levels of difficulty 
thus proved important. Scenarios of similar difficulty allow 
people to return and practice their skills; advancing to the 
next level gives them opportunity to tackle more complex 
situations, which forced them to acquire a higher skill level 
(which they appreciated) and increased confidence. 
Designing beacon parks as technological training 
grounds 
An important component of how a beacon park is 
experienced relies on its set up on the terrain and how it is 
presented to recreationists. In this work, we evolved the 
beacon park over our study period. Based on our 
observations and self-reflections about our practices, we 
now share the varied decisions we made about this 
technological training ground, and how it influenced 
participants’ ability to practice and develop their skills and 
team coordination practices.  
Physical constraints in the beacon park  
The beacon park is a technology-augmented context for 
training, where it should be designed to mimic real-life 
threat situations. This implies a combination of two things: 
real life elements as reflected in the terrain; and the 
technology itself. 
Ideally, we wanted terrain that was on a steep slope 
resembling an avalanche slope. However, this desire had to 
be balanced against how accessible the beacon park would 
be for participants, and the constraints imposed by the 
terrain the ski resort management provided for us to use. 
The somewhat flat terrain we used (which is true of most 
beacon parks) did not match a typical avalanche slope. As 
well, the snow quality differed from the varied snow that 
could result from an avalanche, as P3c critiqued:  
“The beacon park is generally in a flat area, on snow that is 
easy to access and walk on. In a real avalanche, the terrain 
would be much steeper and walking in avalanche debris is 
more like walking on boulders. So this is not exactly 
realistic.” (P3c) 
In addition, the trampled ground of a beacon park does not 
visually resemble a real avalanche, which rescuers would 
normally scan for visual cues to determine the avalanche 
path and the debris zone.  
The technological factors are the number of practice 
beacons and how they were located and buried across the 
area at various depths. This greatly influences scenario 
difficulty. Deeper burials are more difficult to pinpoint, and 
particular combinations and distances of activated beacons 
alters how searchers see signals. Yet the terrain constrains 
the burial depth (e.g., due to the current snow depth) and 
how far apart one can place the beacons (due to site size). 
Thus our terrain choice and where to position each beacon 
had an important impact on the range and degree of a 
scenario’s simulated avalanche accident fidelity.  
Scenarios require explicit communication of their details 
Because there is no real avalanche, details of scenarios have 
to be explicitly communicated to the participants. This 
includes where the scenarios are located and the number of 
victims. In our study, the facilitator verbally explained each 
scenario to the participants, and bamboo poles marking the 
top and bottom of the imagined avalanche zone served as 
visual cues. Although participants were generally able to 
imagine the avalanche path and the debris zone, others 
found that more challenging. For example, P10a mentioned: 
“The run out zone (or where the debris would be) requires 
a lot of imagination on my part, maybe this could be 
improved.” (P10a). Factors that require explicit 
communication affect learning because psychological 
fidelity is undermined. 
Beacon park flexibility 
While we had to adjust to the physical constraints of the 
terrain, the beacon park system is very simple—a set of 
buried beacon signals that can individually be turned on or 
off—which makes it highly configurable and flexible in 
terms of constructing scenarios for different learning 
situations, e.g., how people navigated through the park, 
how they configured it for single or multiple burials, how 
different skills could be practiced, and how more structured 
teaching can be layered atop of it.  
Through our observations, we saw how the beacon park 
was sometimes seen as this flexible platform supporting a 
variety of learning activities. We observed various teaching 
strategies both between the facilitator and participants, and 
between participants. More experienced participants in a 
group would teach the less experienced participant basic 
skills. For example, P16a (who had companion rescue 
experience) used the beacon park as a place to show his 
girlfriend (P16b) the basic search movements during the 
coarse and fine search, including how one should respond 
to the signal seen in the beacon. In the example of P11a and 
P11b timing each other, we see how certain exercises could 
be created ad hoc in the technological setting of the beacon 
park without the need of external facilitation or suggestion. 
The role of the facilitator  
A good facilitator is someone recognized as an ‘old timer’ 
[24] in the practice of backcountry skiing and avalanche 
companion rescue, and one who is able to pass on their 
skills and knowledge to others. However, most beacon 
parks do not operate with a facilitator. Thus if a team uses 
the beacon park, its members often rely on a more 
experienced team member to mentor them (although that 
person may not necessarily have appropriate training).   
In our study, many of our participants were novices and 
needed some orientation for how to use the beacon park. 
The first role of our facilitator was to introduce the park and 
how to best use it, including what scenarios to do, in what 
order, and where scenarios are physically located. As 
participants pursued scenarios, the facilitator answered 
many questions, ranging from specific questions about 
advanced functions on beacons to deeper understanding of 
rescue strategies. Finally, we found that participants 
appreciated debrief sessions or feedback from the 
facilitator. Once a scenario was completed, the facilitator 
summarized his observations and asked participants to 
describe what they saw, how they felt and how they think 
things could have been better. Through this discussion, the 
facilitator encouraged the participants to realize what they 
could do differently. Those conversations often led to 
improvement in the next scenario performed. For example, 
with the couple P11a and P11b, the facilitator explained a 
specific strategy for probing that is particularly efficient 
with two rescuers; a strategy they tried and found 
successful in the next scenario. Participants recognized the 
value of the facilitator: “Having [the beacon park] staffed 
also really helped, because when you have someone teach 
you, this makes a large difference.” (P10c) 
In our view, the presence of an ‘old timer’ was very 
significant for an effective use of the park. However, 
staffed beacon parks are not the norm. Without the 
facilitator, people could easily develop poor practices that 
could jeopardize how they performed companion rescue 
during a real avalanche.  
DISCUSSION 
Our results provide insights into particular changes that can 
make beacon parks more efficient, more inviting and more 
tailored to the training of backcountry recreationists. In 
addition, our work also has particular ramifications for 
CSCW. Specifically, the advent of mobile computing 
means that non-expert collaborators are now using 
sophisticated technology while on the move and within 
specific contexts. Unlike desktop computers that people can 
learn while at home or in the office, training in the field 
becomes increasingly important. For this reason, in this 
discussion, we focus on high-level strategies that can be 
applied to technological training grounds beyond avalanche 
companion rescue. These include training and simulation 
systems for non-experts in many fields, including but not 
limited to extreme sports. 
The value of progressive scales of difficulty 
We saw significant value in using progressive scales of 
difficulty in beacon park scenarios. As previously 
described, the facilitator encouraged participants to follow a 
progression, where he suggested to do simple single burial 
scenarios first until they mastered their basic skills, and 
only then to make their way to the complex multiple 
burials. While solidifying basic skills increased self-
assurance, the complexity progression of the scenarios also 
helped break the false sense of confidence. We saw how 
more complex scenarios provided a space to ask questions, 
reflect on more difficult situations, understand device and 
personal limitations, and overall provide a sense for how 
hard companion rescue could be. Learning is influenced by 
the progression of scenarios, by practicing in context even 
if simulated, and (sometimes) by team mentoring. This 
follows the theory of situated learning [24] where the 
physical and social situation constructs a context for 
participants to make sense of some functions or errors of 
their beacons as they pursue their practice.   
The idea of progressive learning and learning by mastering 
is, of course, not new. Indeed, many formal learning 
environments are structured so that students must achieve 
proficiency at a given difficulty level before they are 
allowed to continue to the next level (for an example in 
computational games, see [26]). In spite of this, 
technological training grounds are not structured in this 
manner; instead, they are offered as environments where 
people attempt to learn on their own and in an ad-hoc 
manner. We believe these training grounds can be improved 
dramatically by offering scenarios of increasing difficulty 
(as we did), by explicitly describing skills that should be 
mastered at that level, and by offering a way for learners to 
‘grade’ themselves in terms of mastering a scenario level. 
Based on our findings, we also suggest that this information 
should be communicated to recreationists in ways that are 
appropriate to the activity and the physical context. For 
example, in outdoor training grounds, using weather 
resistant posters to describe scenarios, potentially 
augmented by digital material (accessible via a mobile 
device) to describe best practices and learning goals. 
Beyond extreme sports training, this strategy can also be 
applied to train volunteers and citizens who are helping in 
disaster relief and emergency situations. In the cases of 
volunteer work and citizen-to-citizen communication [34], 
short training sessions can also include a progressive scale 
of difficulty to help build assurance but not over-
confidence.  
A variety of levels of fidelity 
The beacon park is a technological training ground that 
includes a variety of levels of fidelity along the three 
aspects of environment, equipment and psychological [3] 
(as described in our related works section). Throughout our 
results we have articulated how certain aspects could reach 
a higher level of fidelity while others could not. For beacon 
parks, the level of environmental fidelity is difficult to 
manage, for it is heavily constrained by the terrain 
available. If varied terrain is available, areas should be 
chosen to match the scenario conditions (e.g. steepness of 
the slope, the presence of terrain traps, etc.).  However, the 
level of fidelity for equipment is under our control. As we 
saw, signals from buried beacons are indistinguishable from 
real beacons, and we expect learners to bring in their own 
personal equipment including their personal beacons. This 
situation might be similar to how other researchers are 
aiming at training with new wearable technologies where 
the environmental aspect cannot be adapted, but where the 
technology is “real” and not simulated (e.g. [9,22]). 
The low level of environmental fidelity can be partially 
remedied by manipulating the psychological level of 
fidelity, i.e., the ways participants construct believable 
stories for themselves about the rescue situation. This is 
especially important for practicing team collaboration [3]. 
In our study, this was done by constructing scenarios that 
included a story of how the avalanche happened, using 
buried beacons to represent victims, and by visually 
marking areas in the environment to simulate 
environmental conditions (e.g., bamboo poles indicating 
avalanche boundaries). We saw that participants were 
largely able to construct the story in their minds and reach a 
higher level of psychological fidelity. This strategy echoes 
what Klann describes in his work with fire fighters [22], 
where he argues that it is through ‘playing out’ a scene that 
firemen best expressed their skills and experiences. The 
novelty of each scenario added to their believability since 
others created the scenarios. In addition, we could 
manipulate people’s stress (e.g., by observing, timing and 
critiquing people’s rescue performance), which proved 
effective in increasing the level of psychological fidelity. 
More generally, technological training grounds should 
follow similar practices. When environmental high fidelity 
is rarely possible, which is often the case with natural 
disasters and emergency situations, they should offer a 
story behind each scenario (again, through on-site posters 
and visual markers, and/or through digital media). At its 
best, the technological training ground should offer a ‘full 
mission’ context for practice (in the words of Beaubien and 
Baker [3]) while still operating within the constraints of 
multiple ranges of fidelity.  
Balancing skill development and coordination training 
We saw a large number of participants focus on learning 
individual skills at the cost of communication and 
coordination training. This likely occurs because, at the 
surface level, the beacon park emphasizes the technology 
itself (beacon search), whereas the need for communication 
and coordination learning is tacit and thus easily 
overlooked. This very likely happens with other 
technological training grounds, particularly in activities that 
require a personal digital device while in a group setting 
(e.g. with wearable devices [9,22]). More specifically, there 
is relatively little research that looks at how non-experts 
familiarize themselves with a new mobile device before 
focusing on communication and coordination.  
The solution is, in part, to make communication and 
coordination learning an explicit activity. Toups et al. [40] 
argued for focusing solely on distributed cognition and 
team coordination training for firefighters, both for 
economical and focus reasons. They proposed a ‘zero-
fidelity’ computational simulation that removes the realistic 
elements found in higher fidelity simulations to keep only 
the bare essentials for learning team coordination (such as 
eliminating fire and smoke visualizations but keeping time 
pressure for example). In outdoor physical training grounds, 
the simulation takes place in a real world setting and offers 
the opportunity to focus solely on the coordination practices 
if desired. The scenarios and learning descriptions 
mentioned earlier should include these not only as goals to 
incrementally master, but should describe the steps on how 
to achieve them. If individuals (rather than teams) appear 
on site, the usage descriptions of the area should highly 
encourage them to find other like-minded people to do the 
exercises together. Perhaps meeting times can be advertised 
as a way for ad hoc groups to gather opportunistically. This 
solution, of course, will show better results if participants 
are familiar with the technology required before and can 
focus on the coordination training rather than mastering 
their own device.  
Supporting the community of practice 
As we have presented earlier, we see backcountry 
recreationists as a community of practice. However, we also 
observed that learning from others within beacon parks is 
not as common as it could be. As with communication and 
coordination, this is also likely due to the emphasis on the 
technology, which seemingly favors individual skill 
development over team learning. This also likely occurs 
with other technological training grounds. 
A partial solution is to recast the technological training 
ground in a way that encourages mentorship and facilitation 
within the community of practice. Since the scenarios can 
be structured and ready to use, members of the community 
can go straight to the heart of the topic without spending a 
whole day preparing the site, which was identified as a 
challenge in previous research on avalanche companion 
rescue [10]. Importantly, technological training grounds 
such as beacon parks can be designed as a common space 
where members of the community can group and build 
relationships between each other, which create 
opportunities for more knowledge exchanges.  
For example, technological training grounds could be 
presented and advertised as an area inviting people with 
more skills to teach novices particular skills. For instance, 
when a person has mastered a particular scenario difficulty 
and skill, they could be encouraged to mentor others going 
through simpler scenarios. The payback is that people often 
gain even more mastery by teaching. In addition, a training 
ground can advertise particular times as a ‘meet and greet’ 
event for like-minded people to learn, socialize, and meet 
potential activity partners (for example ski partners in the 
case of the beacon park). Moreover, a training ground can 
leverage existing social organizations, such as clubs, 
schools and groups. Communities of practice often have 
structured clubs where its members gladly teach others 
through courses, or act as facilitators to share their expertise 
and support discussion amongst all participants (similarly to 
the role our facilitator played on site). Finally, many high-
risk communities of practice encourage skill development 
through competition (e.g., mountain bike racing, 
competitive rock climbing). The training ground can be 
offered as a place for holding competitions, where teams 
‘race’ against each other.  
Overall, we found that it is important to create opportunities 
for recreationists to meet with others and to exchange 
knowledge. The strategies proposed above can be applied in 
cases where unacquainted people engage in real life 
exercises to train for a variety of situations. For example, in 
emergency response, teams of on-site workers or volunteers 
would benefit from learning from each other as part of a 
community of practice, even if they are supported by 
coordinators who are in a remote command center [9]. The 
ability to work together on site can increase team 
coordination and situational awareness and hence take away 
some of the strain on the link between the command center 
and the disaster scene.  
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study we presented in this paper has some limitations 
(which we see as great starting points for future research). 
The study was conducted on a short period of time (4 
observation days) and would benefit from an extended 
observation period to see if more practice patterns emerge 
and also to try other strategies in maintaining and designing 
the practice scenarios. On the positive side, the study results 
we saw are very much in keeping with our own previous 
experiences in beacon parks, where what we saw appears to 
be a representative sample. Of course, further participants 
could also lead to a more detailed understanding of the 
experience and nuances of using the beacon park. 
Our results are qualitative, where they helped us identify 
particular learning strategies within the beacon park 
training ground.  A next step is to collect performance data 
after completing various learning stages to evaluate the 
efficiency of these learning strategies in making 
recreationists faster at companion rescue.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have looked at the specific case of 
avalanche beacon training parks as a way to illustrate how 
technological training grounds can support skill 
development and team coordination training for 
recreationists. With regards to the design of technological 
training grounds beyond avalanche training parks, our 
findings point to the importance of progressive scales of 
difficulty; the management of different levels of fidelity; 
the balance between skill development and team 
coordination training; and strategies for supporting a 
community of practice. These findings not only point to the 
future design of technological training parks for multiple 
communities of practice, but also build on and expand 
beyond previous work in CSCW about team training, ad 
hoc and volunteer teams and emergency coordination.  
We reiterate that one of the distinctive aspects of this work 
is our focus on recreationists ad hoc teams rather than 
professionals. We also believe our findings can apply to 
other non-expert teams in non-extreme situations. For 
example, Dunlap et. al. [15] explored the role of 
technological training grounds for learning by citizen 
scientists who may have little background in the area. 
While the authors initially focused on skill acquisition 
(which also involved a mobile device), feedback from 
citizen science experts suggested that they should also 
consider citizen science as a community of practice, i.e., 
where citizen scientists should be expected to learn and 
perform the activity together, including self-coordination. 
While their context and methodology differs significantly 
from ours, the fact that their results are similar to our own 
suggests that these results are likely generalizable to 
technological training grounds supporting different 
communities of practice in a variety of domains.  
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